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A protocol for multiparty quantum secret splitting (MQSS) with an ordered N
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and Bell state measurements is recently pro-
posed by Deng et al. [Phys. Lett. A 354(2006)190]. We analyzed the security of
the protocol and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper ex-
cept for the agent Bob who adopts intercept-and-resend attack. Bob can obtain all
the information of Alice’s alone without being found. We also propose an improved
version of the MQSS protocol.
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Quantum mechanics principles supplied many interesting applications in the field of quan-
tum information in the last decade. The interesting aspect of employing quantum mechanics
for quantum secret sharing (QSS) is that it allows the unconditionally secure distribution
of the information between the participants. It is a generalization of classical secret sharing
[1, 2] to a quantum scenario [3]. Since the pioneering work presented by Hillery et al. in 1999
by using three-particle and four-particle Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [3], a lot
of QSS protocols [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] have been proposed
in both theoretical and experimental aspects. QSS is an useful tool in the cryptographic
applications. Suppose that Alice wants to send a message to her agents, Bob and Charlie,
who are at remote places to deal with her business. However Alice doubts that one of them
may be dishonest and she does not know who the dishonest one is, but she knows that if
the two of them coexist, the honest one can keep the dishonest one from doing any damage.
To prevent the dishonest man from destroying the business, Alice splits the secret messages
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2into two encrypted parts and sends each one a part so that neither individual is able to
obtain all of the original information unless they collaborate.
Recently, Deng et al. [19] proposed a multiparty quantum secret splitting and quantum
state sharing protocol (hereafter called Deng’s protocol) for splitting a secret message among
three parties, say Alice, Bob, and Charlie with EPR pairs following some ideas in Refs.
[17, 20]. In this paper, we show that Deng’s protocol can be eavesdropped by a dishonest
agent Bob who adopts intercept-and-resend attack, and Bob can obtain the whole secret
messages of Alice’s alone without being found. Moreover, we propose an improved version
of Deng’s protocol.
Let us briefly review Deng’s protocol. For convenience, we only discuss the simple case in
which there are three parties, the Boss Alice, two agents, Bob and Charlie. The principle for
the case of multiparty is the same as this simple one with just a little modification or not.
In Deng’s protocol, the agent Bob prepares an ordered N EPR polarization photon pairs in
the same quantum state: |ψ−〉AC =
1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉C − |1〉A|0〉C). The N ordered EPR pairs are
denoted with {[P1(A), P1(C)], [P2(A), P2(C)], . . . , [PN(A), PN(C)]}. Bob takes one photon
from each EPR pair to form an ordered EPR partner photon sequence, say [P1(A), P2(A),
. . . , PN (A)], called the SA sequence. The remaining EPR partner photons compose another
EPR partner photon sequence [P1(C), P2(C), . . . , PN (C)], which is called the SC sequence.
Then Bob first sends the SA sequence to Alice and keeps the SC sequence. Alice picks out a
sufficiently large subset of photons from the sequence SA for the eavesdropping check of the
transmission. The check can be completed with the following procedures: (a) Alice tells Bob
which photons he has chosen and Bob picks out the correlated photons in the sequence SC .
(b) Bob randomly chooses the measuring basis (MB) Z or X to measure the chosen photons.
(c) Bob tells Alice which MB he has chosen for each photon and his measurement results.
(d) Alice uses the same MBs as Bob to measure the corresponding photons and checks the
eavesdropping with the results of Bob’s. If the error ε1 is small, Alice and Bob can conclude
that there are no eavesdropping in the line, this is the first eavesdropping check. After
that, Bob randomly chooses one of the four local unitary operations Ui (U0 ≡ I, U1 ≡ σx,
U2 ≡ iσy, U3 ≡ σz, I is the identity operator, σi are the Pauli operators, and i = 0, 1, 2, 3)
to encrypt each of the photons in the SC sequence, say UB, and then sends the SC sequence
to Charlie. Alice and Charlie analyze the error rate ε2 of the transmission of SC sequence,
similar to that for SA sequence. The difference is that Alice should require Bob to publish
3his unitary operations on the sample photons before she accomplishes the eavesdropping
check. This is the second eavesdropping check. If the error ε2 is small, Alice and Charlie
continue to the next step; otherwise they have to abandon their transmission. Alice selects a
subset of photons as the samples for eavesdropping check and chooses one of the four unitary
operations randomly on each sample photon. For other photons in the SA sequence (except
for those for eavesdropping check), Alice encodes her secret message MA on them with the
four unitary operations, and then sends the sequence SA to Charlie. Charlie performs the
Bell measurements on the EPR photon pairs and reads out the combination of operations
done by Alice and Bob. Alice and Charlie finish the checking of error rate of the samples
selected by Alice, if the error is small, Alice tells Bob and Charlie to collaborate for reading
out the message MA.
As pointed out in the Refs. [3, 4], if a dishonest agent in an MQSS cannot eavesdrop
the secret messages without disturbing the quantum system, any eavesdropper can be found
out. In this way, the main goal for the security of an MQSS protocol is simplified to keep
the dishonest agent from eavesdropping the secret messages. In Deng’s protocol, any eaves-
dropper cannot get the secret messages of Alice’s except for the dishonest agent Bob who
adopts intercept-and-resend attack. Bob can eavesdrop the secret messages freely without
being found. Now we discuss the intercept-and-resend attack adopted by Bob in detail.
In order to check for the eavesdropping there are two main steps: Alice-Bob check and
Alice-Charlie check, i.e., the step(4) and step (6) in Deng’s protocol. We describe the
intercept-and-resend attack from step (5) after Alice and Bob have finished the first eaves-
dropping check and no eavesdropping is found in Alice-Bob line. Instead of sending to
Charlie the SC sequence, Bob could instead prepare a new ordered M (M < N) EPR pairs
in the same quantum state: |ψ−〉A′C′ =
1√
2
(|0〉A′|1〉C′ − |1〉A′|0〉C′) according to the numbers
of the remaining EPR pairs in SA sequence after the first eavesdropping check. Bob takes
one photon from each new EPR pair to form an new ordered EPR partner photon sequence,
say [P1(A
′), P2(A
′), . . . , PM(A
′)], called the SA′ sequence. The remaining EPR partner pho-
tons compose another EPR partner photon sequence [P1(C
′), P2(C
′), . . . , PM (C
′)], which is
called the SC′ sequence. Bob randomly chooses one of the four local unitary operations Ui
to encrypt each of the photons in the sequence SC′ , say UB′ , and then he sends the sequence
SC′ to Charlie and keeps the SA′ sequence. Moreover, note that Bob also keeps the original
sequence SC .
4After Charlie confirms Alice he has received the SC sequence (in fact, the sequence he
receives is the SC′ sequence) from Bob, Alice announces which photons will be used to check
for eavesdropping, Bob performs entanglement swapping between those photons in sequence
SC and the corresponding photons in the sequence SA′. As a result, Alice and Charlie
perfectly share some new EPR pairs consisting of the photons of sequence SA and SC′ for
those positions that are going to be tested for eavesdropping. Now Bob announces those
unitary operations corresponding to his measurement results of the entanglement swapping.
Alice and Charlie will find that all the photons that they test reveal no eavesdropping. In
this way, Alice and Charlie confirm that there are no eavesdropping in the line. Alice selects
a subset of photons as the samples for eavesdropping check and chooses one of the four
unitary operations randomly on each sample. For other photons in the SA sequence (except
for those for eavesdropping check), Alice encodes her secret message MA on them with the
four unitary operations, and then sends the sequence SA to Charlie.
Bob intercepts the sequence SA when Alice sends the sequence SA to Charlie, and performs
the Bell measurements on the EPR photon pairs, i.e., on the photons of sequences SA and
SC , and read out the unitary operations that Alice has performed on the photons of sequence
SA, i.e., Alice’s secret messages. Then Bob performs the correct unitary operations as Alice
on the photons of the SA′ sequence and sends the SA′ sequence (except for those photons
for eavesdropping check) to Charlie. As a result, Charlie possesses another ordered M ′
(M ′ < M) EPR pairs.
Charlie confirms Alice he has received the SA sequence (in fact, the sequence he receives
is the SA′ sequence), and performs the Bell measurements on the photons A
′ and C ′. Alice
announces which photons will be used to check for eavesdropping, she first requires Bob
to publish the unitary operations done on the correlated photons in the sequence SC , and
then she requires Charlie to tell her the results of the Bell measurements. Bob announces
the unitary operations that he has performed on the photons of the sequence SC′ . Alice
analyzes the error rate of the sample photons with Charlie’s Bell measurement results,
Bob’s operations, and her own operations. As a result, Alice will find that there are no
eavesdropping in the line, and tell Bob and Charlie to collaborate for reading out the message
MA. In this way, Bob can completely obtain Alice’s secret messages alone without being
found. Finally, if Bob wants to let Charlie obtain the secret messages of Alice’s, he announces
the accurate unitary operations UB′ he has performed on the photons in the sequence SC′.
5Otherwise, Charlie will not obtain the accurate secret messages of Alice’s.
So far we have pointed out that Deng’s protocol is not secure when the agent Bob is
dishonest in the case of three-party QSS. Bob can eavesdrop the secret messages of Alice’s
alone without being found during the process of eavesdropping check by adopting intercept-
and-resend attack. The similar case happens for MQSS. For improving the security of
Deng’s protocol [19], the three parties must have the ability to keep the eavesdropper from
eavesdropping the secret messages. The Deng’s MQSS protocol is secure if Alice and Charlie
can prevent the agent Bob who adopts intercept-and-resend attack from eavesdropping the
secret messages. Now let us describe the modified Deng’s MQSS protocol in the case of M
agents as follows.
Step 1: Alice prepares an ordered N EPR polarization photon pairs in the same quantum
state: |ψ−〉AT =
1√
2
(|0〉A|1〉T − |1〉A|0〉T ). She divides the photons into two sequences:
[P1(A), P2(A), . . . , PN (A)], [P1(T ), P2(T ), . . . , PN (T )], which are called SA sequence and
ST sequence, respectively. Then Alice sends the ST sequence to Bob.
Step 2: After receiving Bob’s confirmation of receiving the ST sequence, Alice picks out
a sufficiently large subset of photons from the sequence SA for the eavesdropping check of
the transmission.
The check can be completed with the following procedures: (a1) Alice tells Bob which
photons he has chosen and Bob picks out the correlated photons in the sequence ST (a2)
Bob randomly chooses the measuring basis (MB) Z or X to measure the sample photons.
(a3) Bob tells Alice the MB he has chosen for each photon and the results of his measure-
ments. (a4) Alice uses the same MBs as Bob to measure the corresponding photons in SA
sequence and checks the eavesdropping with the results of Bob’s. If the error rate is small,
Alice and Bob can conclude that there are no eavesdropping in the line. Alice and Bob
continue to perform step 3; otherwise they have to discard their transmission and abort the
communication.
Step 3: Bob randomly chooses some photons from ST sequence as sample photons and
performs a Hadamard transformation (H transformation) on each of the sample photons.
The H transformation can transform each qubit as
H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉),
6H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (1)
For the other photons in ST sequence, Bob randomly chooses one of the four local unitary
operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) to encrypt each of the photons, say UB, and then he sends the
sequence ST to Charlie.
Step 4: Charlie confirms Alice and Bob that he has received the ST sequence, then Bob
announces the position of the sample photons to Alice and Charlie. Alice and Charlie analyze
the error rate of the transmission of sequence ST , similar to that in step 2. The difference is
that Charlie should first perform a H transformation on each of the sample photons before
she accomplishes the eavesdropping check. If the transmission is secure, Charlie randomly
chooses some photons from ST sequence as sample photons and performs a H transformation
on each of the sample photons. For the other photons in ST sequence, Charlie randomly
performs one of the four unitary operations on each photon, say UC , and then sends the
sequence ST to the next agents.
Step 5: After repeating the step 4 M − 3 times, the ST sequence is received securely by
the (M − 1)th agent, say Yang. The (M − 2)th agent announces the position of the sample
photons to Alice and Yang, then Alice and Yang analyze the error rate of the transmission
of sequence ST , similar to that in step 4. The difference is that Alice should require the
foregoing M − 2 agents except for the (M − 2)th agent to publish their unitary operations
on the sample photons before she accomplishes the eavesdropping check. If the transmission
is secure, Yang randomly chooses some photons from ST sequence as sample photons and
performs a H transformation on each of the sample photons. For the other photons in ST
sequence, Yang randomly performs one of the four unitary operations on each photon, say
UY , and then sends the sequence ST back to Alice.
Step 6: Alice confirms Yang that she has received the sequence ST , then Yang announces
the position of the sample photons to Alice. Alice picks out the sample photons from
ST sequence and the correlated photons from SA sequence for the eavesdropping check of
transmission. This can be completed as follows: (b1) The foregoingM −1 agents except for
Yang tell Alice the operations that they have performed on the sample photons. (b2) Alice
performs a Hadamard transformation on each of the sample photons and then performs the
Bell measurements on the EPR photon pairs after she knows the M − 2 agents’ operations.
(b3) If Alice’s Bell measurement results coincide with the M − 2 agents’ operations, Alice
7continues to the next step; otherwise Alice has to discard her transmission and abort the
communication.
Step 7: Alice encodes her secret messagesMA on the photons in SA sequence with the four
unitary operations, say UA. Then she prepares a sufficiently large number of single photons,
which we call as checking photons, in one of the four quantum states that constitute two
bases {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}, where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Alice
mixes these checking photons with the SA sequence and ST sequence respectively, and firstly
sends the ST sequence to the last agent, Zach.
Step 8: After receiving Zach’s confirmation of receiving the ST sequence, Alice tells
Zach the position and the preparation basis of the checking photons. Zach picks out the
corresponding checking photons and measures them in those basis and compares the results
with Alice publicly. If the error is small, Alice and Zach continue to the next step; otherwise
they have to abandon their transmission.
Step 9: Alice sends the SA sequence to Zach. Alice and Zach analyze the security of
transmission of SA sequence, similar to that in step 8. If the error is small, Zach continues
to the next step; otherwise they have to abandon their communication.
Step 10: Zach performs the Bell measurements on the EPR photon pairs and reads out
the combination of the operations done by Alice, Bob, . . . , and Yang, i.e., UZ = UA ⊗UB ⊗
. . .⊗ UY .
Step 11: If all the agents agree to collaborate, they can read out the secret messages MA,
otherwise they will abandon the results of the transmission.
Up to now, we have proposed an improved version of Deng’s MQSS protocol. The mod-
ified MQSS protocol is secure by randomly performing the Hadamard transformation and
introducing auxiliary checking photons. In this way, if the eavesdroppers including the agents
attempt to eavesdrop the secret messages, their eavesdropping behaviors will be detected
when Alice compared the results with the agents.
In summary, we analyzed the security of the MQSS protocol proposed by Deng et al.
[19] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for the agent
Bob who adopts intercept-and-resend attack. Bob can get all the secret messages of Alice’s
without being detected. Finally, we present a possible improvement of the MQSS protocol
security via randomly performing the Hadamard transformation and introducing auxiliary
checking photons. With these modifications, Deng’s MQSS protocol is secure not only
8against the outsider’s eavesdropping but also against the agent’s eavesdropping.
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